第一の格率は，わたしの国の法律と慣習に従うことだった。その際，神の恵みを受けて子供のころから教えられた宗教をしっかりと変わらずに守りつづけ，他のすべてにおいては，わたしが共に生きなければならない人のうちで最も良識ある人びとが実際に広く承認している，極端からはもっとも遠い，いちばん穏健な意見に従って自分を導いていく。というのも，わたしは自分の意見をすべて検討に付そうと思って，その時からすでにそれらを無に等しいものとみなしはじめていたので，いちばん良識ある人たちの意見に従うのが最善と確信していたからだ。おそらくペルシア人や中国人の間にも，われわれの間にいるのと同じぐらい良識を具えた人びとがいるであろうが，わたしには，自分が共に生きることになる人びとに従って自分を律するのがもっとも有益だと思われた。そしてその人たちの意見が実際にどのょうなものかを知るには，かれらの言うことよりもむしろ行うことに注意すべきだと思われた。その理由はただ，われわれの道徳が退廃してくると，自分の信じることをすべて言おうとする人はほとんどいなくなるし，そればかりか，多くの人は自分が何を信じているか自分でも分からなくなるからである。人があることを信じる思考の働きは，それを信じていると認識する働きとは異なっていて，この両者は互いにもう一方を伴わないことがたびたびあるからだ。さらにわたしは，等しく受け入れられているいくつもの意見のうち，いちばん穏健なものだけを選んだ。一つには，あらゆる極端は悪いのが通例であり，穏健な意見は行うのにいつもいちばん都合がよく，おそらくは最善であるからだ。また一つには，穏健な意見に従えば，やりそこねた場合にも，両極端の一方を選んだあとにもう一方をとるべきだった，とわかるよりも，真の道からの隔たりが少なくてすむからだ。そして特にわたしは，自分の自由をいくらかでも削るような約束は，すべて極端の部類へ入れた。とはいえ，次のような法を認めないわけではない。法は，弱い精神の動揺を癒すために，何らかの善い計画を持つとき，あるいは善悪にかかわらない計画を持つときにさえも，取引の安全のために，誓願や契約をなすことで，いやでもその計画を貫かせてくれる。約束を極端の部類に入れたのは，そうした法を認めないからではない。この世にはいつも同一の状態でとどまっているものは一つもないと認め，とくにわたし自身，自分の判断をしだいに完成させこそすれ，けっして悪くはしないと心に決めていたので，もしその時あることを是認したために，後になってそのことがひょっとして善でなくなるか，わたしが善だと認めなくなったときにも，なおそれを善とせざるをえなかったとしたら，わたしは良識にたいして大きな過ちを犯すことになる，と考えたからである。
The first was to obey the laws and customs
of my country, adhering firmly to the Faith
in which, by the grace of God, I had been
educated from my childhood, and regulating
my conduct in every other matter according
to the most moderate opinions, and the farthest
removed from extremes, which should happen
to be adopted in practice with general consent
of the most judicious of those among whom
I might be living. For, as I had from that
time begun to hold my own opinions for nought
because I wished to subject them all to examination,
I was convinced that I could not do better
than follow in the meantime the opinions
of the most judicious; and although there
are some perhaps among the Persians and Chinese
as judicious as among ourselves, expediency
seemed to dictate that I should regulate
my practice conformably to the opinions of
those with whom I should have to live; and
it appeared to me that, in order to ascertain
the real opinions of such, I ought rather
to take cognizance of what they practised
than of what they said, not only because,
in the corruption of our manners, there are
few disposed to speak exactly as they believe,
but also because very many are not aware
of what it is that they really believe; for,
as the act of mind by which a thing is believed
is different from that by which we know that
we believe it, the one act is often found
without the other. Also, amid many opinions
held in equal repute, I chose always the
most moderate, as much for the reason that
these are always the most convenient for
practice, and probably the best, (for all
excess is generally vicious,) as that, in
the event of my falling into error, I might
be at less distance from the truth than if,
having chosen one of the extremes, it should
turn out to be the other which I ought to
have adopted. And I placed in the class of
extremes especially all promises by which
somewhat of our freedom is abridged; not
that I disapproved of the laws which, to
provide against the instability of men of
feeble resolution, when what is sought to
be accomplished is some good, permit engagements
by vows and contracts binding the parties
to persevere in it, or even, for the security
of commerce, sanction similar engagements
where the purpose sought to be realized is
indifferent: but because I did not find anything
on earth which was wholly superior to change,
and because, for myself in particular, I
hoped gradually to perfect my judgments,
and not to suffer them to deteriorate, I
would have deemed it a grave sin against
good sense, if, for the reason that I approved
of something at a particular time, I therefore
bound myself to hold it for good at a subsequent
time, when perhaps it had ceased to be so,
or I had ceased to esteem it such.