BUT the difficulties occur in a new principality.
And firstly, if it be not entirely new, but
is, as it were, a member of a state which,
taken collectively, may be called composite,
the changes arise chiefly from an inherent
difficulty which there is in all new principalities;
for men change their rulers willingly, hoping
to better themselves, and this hope induces
them to take up arms against him who rules:
wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards
find by experience they have gone from bad
to worse. This follows also on another natural
and common necessity, which always causes
a new prince to burden those who have submitted
to him with his soldiery and with infinite
other hardships which he must put upon his
new acquisition.
In this way you have enemies in all those
whom you have injured in seizing that principality,
and you are not able to keep those friends
who put you there because of your not being
able to satisfy them in the way they expected,
and you cannot take strong measures against
them, feeling bound to them. For, although
one may be very strong in armed forces, yet
in entering a province one has always need
of the goodwill of the natives.
For these reasons Louis XII, King of France,
quickly occupied Milan, and as quickly lost
it; and to turn him out the first time it
only needed Lodovico's own forces; because
those who had opened the gates to him, finding
themselves deceived in their hopes of future
benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment
of the new prince. It is very true that,
after acquiring rebellious provinces a second
time, they are not so lightly lost afterwards,
because the prince, with little reluctance,
takes the opportunity of the rebellion to
punish the delinquents, to clear out the
suspects, and to strengthen himself in the
weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose
Milan the first time it was enough for the
Duke Lodovico to raise insurrections on the
borders; but to cause him to lose it a second
time it was necessary to bring the whole
world against him, and that his armies should
be defeated and driven out of Italy; which
followed from the causes above mentioned.
Nevertheless Milan was taken from France
both the first and the second time. The general
reasons for the first have been discussed;
it remains to name those for the second,
and to see what resources he had, and what
any one in his situation would have had for
maintaining himself more securely in his
acquisition than did the King of France.
Now I say that those dominions which, when
acquired, are added to an ancient state by
him who acquires them, are either of the
same country and language, or they are not.
When they are, it is easier to hold them,
especially when they have not been accustomed
to self-government; and to hold them securely
it is enough to have destroyed the family
of the prince who was ruling them; because
the two peoples, preserving in other things
the old conditions, and not being unlike
in customs, will live quietly together, as
one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony,
and Normandy, which have been bound to France
for so long a time: and, although there may
be some difference in language, nevertheless
the customs are alike, and the people will
easily be able to get on amongst themselves.
He who has annexed them, if he wishes to
hold them, has only to bear in mind two considerations:
the one, that the family of their former
lord is extinguished; the other, that neither
their laws nor their taxes are altered, so
that in a very short time they will become
entirely one body with the old principality.
But when states are acquired in a country
differing in language, customs, or laws,
there are difficulties, and good fortune
and great energy are needed to hold them,
and one of the greatest and most real helps
would be that he who has acquired them should
go and reside there. This would make his
position more secure and durable, as it has
made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding
all the other measures taken by him for holding
that state, if he had not settled there,
would not have been able to keep it. Because,
if one is on the spot, disorders are seen
as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy
them; but if one is not at hand, they heard
of only when they are one can no longer remedy
them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged
by your officials; the subjects are satisfied
by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing
to be good, they have more cause to love
him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear
him. He who would attack that state from
the outside must have the utmost caution;
as long as the prince resides there it can
only be wrested from him with the greatest
difficulty.
The other and better course is to send colonies
to one or two places, which may be as keys
to that state, for it necessary either to
do this or else to keep there a great number
of cavalry and infantry. A prince does not
spend much on colonies, for with little or
no expense he can send them out and keep
them there, and he offends a minority only
of the citizens from whom he takes lands
and houses to give them to the new inhabitants;
and those whom he offends, remaining poor
and scattered, are never able to injure him;
whilst the rest being uninjured are easily
kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious
not to err for fear it should happen to them
as it has to those who have been despoiled.
In conclusion, I say that these colonies
are not costly, they are more faithful, they
injure less, and the injured, as has been
said, I being poor and scattered, cannot
hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men
ought either to be well treated or crushed,
because they can avenge themselves of lighter
injuries, of more serious ones they cannot;
therefore the injury that is to be done to
a man ought to be of such a kind that one
does not stand in fear of revenge.
But in maintaining armed men there in place
of colonies one spends much more, having
to consume on the garrison all income from
the state, so that the acquisition turns
into a loss, and many more are exasperated,
because the whole state is injured; through
the shifting of the garrison up and down
all become acquainted with hardship, and
all become hostile, and they are enemies
who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are
yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore,
such guards are as useless as a colony is
useful.
Again, the prince who holds a country differing
in the above respects ought to make himself
the head and defender of his powerful neighbours,
and to weaken the more powerful amongst them,
taking care that no foreigner as powerful
as himself shall, by any accident, get a
footing there; for it will always happen
that such a one will be introduced by those
who are discontented, either through excess
of ambition or through fear, as one has seen
already. The Romans were brought into Greece
by the Aetolians; and in every other country
where they obtained a footing they were brought
in by the inhabitants. And the usual course
of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful
foreigner enters a country, all the subject
states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred
which they feel against the ruling power.
So that in respect to these subject states
he has not to take any trouble to gain them
over to himself, for the whole of them quickly
rally to the state which he has acquired
there. He has only to take care that they
do not get hold of too much power and too
much authority, and then with his own forces,
and with their goodwill, he can easily keep
down the more powerful of them, so as to
remain entirely master in the country. And
he who does not properly manage this business
will soon lose what he has acquired, and
whilst he does hold it he will have endless
difficulties and troubles.
第３章 混合した君主国
しかし新興の君主国には困難が生じます。まず第一に，完全な新興の君主国ではなく，もともと君主国であったものが，集約されて混成国家と呼ばれるものの一員となった場合には，変化は主にあらゆる新興の君主国につきまとう固有の難点から生じます。というのは，自分がより良い状態になるという希望を抱いて，人はよろこんで支配者を変えるものですが，この希望のせいで彼らは支配する者に抗して武器を取るからです。彼らは後になって経験によってさらに悪い状態になっていることを悟るので，その点では欺かれているのですが。このことから，別の当然でもあり普通でもあるような必然的結果を生じるのですが，いつもそのせいで新しい君主は，服属する人々を，その兵士によって，また新領土に課すにちがいない無数の苦役によって，苦しめることになるのです。
こうして君主は，その君主国を奪うときに傷つけたあらゆる人たちを敵にまわし，自分をその地位につけた人々も，彼らが期待したようには満足させることができないので，味方につけておくことはできず，しかも彼らに恩義を感じるため，彼らにたいして強硬な手段をとることもできないのです。というのも，たとえ武力では極めて強力であったとしても，その地方に入るには，いつだって土地の人たちの善意が必要なのですから。
こうしたわけで，フランス王ルイ十二世は，たちまちミラノを占領したものの，たちまちこれを失ったのです。最初のときは，彼を追い払うのにルドヴィーコの手勢だけで十分でありました。なぜなら，ルイ十二世に城門を開いた者たちは，将来の幸福という希望で欺かれたことを悟り，新しい君主の虐待に我慢できなかったからなのです。二度目に謀反の地を奪取した後では，その後そうやすやすとは失うことはないことは，まさに真実です。なぜなら，君主は，さして思いわずらうことなく，謀反の機会をとらえて謀反人を処罰し，疑わしい者を一掃し，自分の弱点を補強するからです。こうして，フランスがミラノを失うには，最初はルドヴィーコ公[1]が国境で暴動を起すだけで十分だったのに，二度目には全世界を彼に対抗させ，彼の軍隊を打ち破り，イタリアから駆逐することが必要だったのです。これは上に述べた原因から生じたことなのです。
にもかかわらず，ミラノは一度ならず二度までもフランスから奪還されたのです。最初のときの概略の理由はもう述べましたが，二度目の理由を挙げること，そして，フランス王にどんな算段があったのか，もしだれかフランス王と同じ立場に置かれたら，獲得した国を彼よりももっと確実に保持するにはどうしたらよいかを見ておくことは，まだやり残しています。
さて，君主が新に領土を獲得してもとからの国家に併合する場合，その領土は同じ国土で言語も同じであるか，そうでないかのどちらかです。同じ場合には，その領土を保持するのは容易ですし，自治に慣れていなければ，なおさらです。その領土を確実に保持するには，それまで支配していた君主の一族を滅ぼしさえすれば十分なのです。なぜなら，その他のことは旧態のままにしておけば，二つの領民は習慣に違いはなく，一緒に平穏に暮していくからです。それは以前からフランスに併合されてきたブルターニュ，ブルゴーニュ，ガスコーニュで見られる通りです。その地方では，言語が少し異るとはいえ，習慣は同じようなものであり，一緒にうまくやっていくのです。併合した君主は，その領土を保持したいのなら，二つの事柄を念頭に置いておくだけでよいのです。その一つは，以前の領主の一族を根絶やしにすることであり，もう一つは，法や税を変えないことです。そうすれば極めて短期間のうちに，新領土はもとの君主国と完全に一体となるのです。
しかし，言語も習慣も法も異る国土で国家を獲得すれば，そこには諸困難があって，その国家を維持するには幸運と多大な精力が必要となります。もっとも巧みで実際的な手立ての一つは，そういう国家を獲得したら，そこに行って住みつくことです。トルコがギリシアでやったのがこうしたことでした。その国を保持するため他の手段をどれだけ講じようと，移住しなかったなら，ギリシアを保つことはできなかったでしょう。なぜなら，現地にいれば，不穏な動きがあればすぐにわかり，たちまち鎮めることができますが，真近かにいなければ，聞きつけたときには騒ぎは大きくなっていて，もう手のつけようもないことでしょう。その上，国が配下の役人たちに略奪されることがなく，臣民は直ちに君主を頼りにできることで納得します。こうして，善良であろうとすれば，君主を慕う動機を持つことになり，善良であろうとしないのであれば，君主を恐れることになるのです。外部からその国に攻撃をしかけようとする者はおそろしく慎重にかまえざるをえません。君主がそこに住みつくかぎり，彼からその国をもぎ取るのは，非常に困難となるのです。
別のもっと良い方策は，国の要といえる二，三の場所に移民団を送ることです。というのも，こうするか，さもなければ多数の騎兵や歩兵を駐屯させることが必要だからです。君主は移民団にはそれほど経費をかけずにすみます。というのは，ほとんど出費をせずに，あるいはまるで費用をかけずに，移民団を送り出し，そこに留め置くことができるからです。君主は，新しい住民に与えるために土地や家を取り上げられる少数の市民だけは感情を害することになりますが，感情を害した人たちは，貧しく散在したままなので，君主に害を与えることができません。一方，他の市民は損害を受けず，容易に平穏を保ち，同時に，強奪された連中と同じことが我が身にふりかかることを恐れて，誤らないようびくびくするのです。要するに私が言いたいのは，こういう移民団は費用がかからず，忠実で，害をなすことも少く，また，もう述べたように，損害を蒙った者たちも貧乏で散在してるから，危害を加えることはできません。この点については，人間を好遇するか叩き潰すかどちらかであるべきだということに，注意しなければなりません。なぜなら人は軽い損害には復讐できるけれど，重大な損害には復讐できないからです。それで，人に損害を与えるときは，恐怖のあまり復讐できないような損害でなければならないのです。
しかし，移民団のかわりに武装兵を保持すると，もっと費用がかさみ，国家の全歳入を駐屯兵に費すことになります。そうなると国家全体に被害が及ぶので，領土の獲得が損になり，もっと多くの人を激昂させます。駐屯軍があちらこちらへ移動することで，だれもが辛苦をなめ，だれもが敵対的になります。そして彼らは自分の土地のうえに打ち倒されたとはいえ，まだ害をなしうる敵なのです。だから，どの理由からみても，こうした守備隊は役に立たず，移民団は有用なのです。
さらに，上に述べた点で異なっている国を保持する君主は，より弱小の近隣国の盟主にして庇護者となり，そのなかのより強大な国の力を弱めようとしなければなりません。そして，なにが起ころうと，自分と同じくらい強力な外国勢力がその地域に地歩を固めないよう注意を払わなければならないのです。というのは，すでに見たとおり，すぎた野望からか恐怖からか，不満を抱いた人たちがこうした勢力を導き入れるでしょうから。アエトリア人がローマ軍をギリシアに招き入れたのですが，ローマが地歩を得たところはどこでも，住民が彼らを招き入れたのです。そして物事の通常の流れとして，強力な外国勢力が侵入するとたちまち，服属国というものは，支配者にたいして抱く恨みにかられて，離反するのです。それで，こうした服属国については，外国勢力は苦労もせずにそれらを手に入れるのです。なぜなら，服属国の全部がその地を獲得した国のもとにたちまち結集するからなのです。服属国があまり大きな力や権限を持たぬよう気をつけさえすれば，自分の勢力とそれらの国の善意とで，その中のより強力な国を容易に抑えこむことができ，そうして国土の完全な主人という地位に留まるのです。こういう努めを適切に果さないと，得たものをたちまち失なうでしょうし，保持している間も，絶え間のない困難と厄介を抱えこむでしょう。