NOW, concerning the characteristics of which
mention is made above, I have spoken of the
more important ones, the others I wish to
discuss briefly under this generality, that
the prince must consider, as has been in
part said before, how to avoid those things
which will make him hated or contemptible;
and as often as he shall have succeeded he
will have fulfilled his part, and he need
not fear any danger in other reproaches.
It makes him hated above all things, as I
have said, to be rapacious, and to be a violator
of the property and women of his subjects,
from both of which he must abstain. And when
neither their property nor honour is touched,
the majority of men live content, and he
has only to contend with the ambition of
a few, whom he can curb with ease in many
ways.
It makes him contemptible to be considered
fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited,
irresolute, from all of which a prince should
guard himself as from a rock; and he should
endeavour to show in his actions greatness,
courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his
private dealings with his subjects let him
show that his judgments are irrevocable,
and maintain himself in such reputation that
no one can hope either to deceive him or
to get round him.
That prince is highly esteemed who conveys
this impression of himself, and he who is
highly esteemed is not easily conspired against;
for, provided it is well known that he is
an excellent man and revered by his people,
he can only be attacked with difficulty.
For this reason a prince ought to have two
fears, one from within, on account of his
subjects, the other from without, on account
of external powers. From the latter he is
defended by being well armed and having good
allies, and if he is well armed he will have
good friends, and affairs will always remain
quiet within when they are quiet without,
unless they should have been already disturbed
by conspiracy; and even should affairs outside
be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations
and has lived as I have said, as long as
he does not despair, he will resist every
attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.
But concerning his subjects, when affairs
outside are disturbed he has only to fear
that they will conspire secretly, from which
a prince can easily secure himself by avoiding
being hated and despised, and by keeping
the people satisfied with him, which it is
most necessary for him to accomplish, as
I said above at length. And one of the most
efficacious remedies that a prince can have
against conspiracies is not to be hated and
despised by the people, for he who conspires
against a prince always expects to please
them by his removal; but when the conspirator
can only look forward to offending them,
he will not have the courage to take such
a course, for the difficulties that confront
a conspirator are infinite. And as experience
shows, many have been the conspiracies, but
few have been successful; because he who
conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take
a companion except from those whom he believes
to be malcontents, and as soon as you have
opened your mind to a malcontent you have
given him the material with which to content
himself, for by denouncing you he can look
for every advantage; so that, seeing the
gain from this course to be assured, and
seeing the other to be doubtful and full
of dangers, he must be a very rare friend,
or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince,
to keep faith with you.
And, to reduce the matter into a small compass,
I say that, on the side of the conspirator,
there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect
of punishment to terrify him; but on the
side of the prince there is the majesty of
the principality, the laws, the protection
of friends and the state to defend him; so
that, adding to all these things the popular
goodwill, it is impossible that any one should
be so rash as to conspire. For whereas in
general the conspirator has to fear before
the execution of his plot, in this case he
has also to fear the sequel to the crime;
because on account of it he has the people
for an enemy, and thus cannot hope for any
escape.
Endless examples could be given on this subject,
but I will be content with one, brought to
pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer
Annibale Bentivoglio, who was prince in Bologna
(grandfather of the present Annibale), having
been murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired
against him, not one of his family survived
but Messer Giovanni, who was in childhood:
immediately after his assassination the people
rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This
sprung from the popular goodwill which the
house of Bentivoglio enjoyed in those days
in Bologna; which was so great that, although
none remained there after the death of Annibale
who were able to rule the state, the Bolognese,
having information that there was one of
the Bentivoglio family in Florence, who up
to that time had been considered the son
of a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him
and gave him the government of their city,
and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni
came in due course to the government.
For this reason I consider that a prince
ought to reckon conspiracies of little account
when his people hold him in esteem; but when
it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards
him, he ought to fear everything and everybody.
And well-ordered states and wise princes
have taken every care not to drive the nobles
to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied
and contented, for this is one of the most
important objects a prince can have.
Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms
of our times is France, and in it are found
many good institutions on which depend the
liberty and security of the king; of these
the first is the parliament and its authority,
because he who founded the kingdom, knowing
the ambition of the nobility and their boldness,
considered that a bit in their mouths would
be necessary to hold them in; and, on the
other side, knowing the hatred of the people,
founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished
to protect them, yet he was not anxious for
this to be the particular care of the king;
therefore, to take away the reproach which
he would be liable to from the nobles for
favouring the people, and from the people
for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter,
who should be one who could beat down the
great and favour the lesser without reproach
to the king. Neither could you have a better
or a more prudent arrangement, or a greater
source of security to the king and kingdom.
From this one can draw another important
conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs
of reproach to the management of others,
and keep those of grace in their own hands.
And further, I consider that a prince ought
to cherish the nobles, but not so as to make
himself hated by the people.
It may appear, perhaps, to some who have
examined the lives and deaths of the Roman
emperors that many of them would be an example
contrary to my opinion, seeing that some
of them lived nobly and showed great qualities
of soul, nevertheless they have lost their
empire or have been killed by subjects who
have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore,
to answer these objections, I will recall
the characters of some of the emperors, and
will show that the causes of their ruin were
not different to those alleged by me; at
the same time I will only submit for consideration
those things that are noteworthy to him who
studies the affairs of those times.
It seems to me sufficient to take all those
emperors who succeeded to the empire from
Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus;
they were Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax,
Julian, Severus and his son Antoninus Caracalla,
Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.
There is first to note that, whereas in other
principalities the ambition of the nobles
and the insolence of the people only have
to be contended with, the Roman emperors
had a third difficulty in having to put up
with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers,
a matter so beset with difficulties that
it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard
thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers
and people; because the people loved peace,
and for this reason they loved the unaspiring
prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike
prince who was bold, cruel, and rapacious,
which qualities they were quite willing he
should exercise upon the people, so that
they could get double pay and give vent to
their greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that
those emperors were always overthrown who,
either by birth or training, had no great
authority, and most of them, especially those
who came new to the principality, recognizing
the difficulty of these two opposing humours,
were inclined to give satisfaction to the
soldiers, caring little about injuring the
people. Which course was necessary, because,
as princes cannot help being hated by someone,
they ought, in the first place, to avoid
being hated by every one, and when they cannot
compass this, they ought to endeavour with
the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred
of the most powerful. Therefore, those emperors
who through inexperience had need of special
favour adhered more readily to the soldiers
than to the people; a course which turned
out advantageous to them or not, accordingly
as the prince knew how to maintain authority
over them.
From these causes it arose that Marcus, [Aurelius],
Pertinax, and Alexander, being all men of
modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to
cruelty, humane, and benignant, came to a
sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and
died honoured, because he had succeeded to
the throne by hereditary title, and owed
nothing either to the soldiers or the people;
and afterwards, being possessed of many virtues
which made him respected, he always kept
both orders in their places whilst he lived,
and was neither hated nor despised.
But Pertinax was created emperor against
the wishes of the soldiers, who, being accustomed
to live licentiously under Commodus, could
not endure the honest life to which Pertinax
wished to reduce them; thus, having given
cause for hatred, to which hatred there was
added contempt for his old age, he was overthrown
at the very beginning of his administration.
And here it should be noted that hatred is
acquired as much by good works as by bad
ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince
wishing to keep his state is very often forced
to do evil; for when that body is corrupt
whom you think you have need of to maintain
yourself- it may be either the people or
the soldiers or the nobles- you have to submit
to its humours and to gratify them, and then
good works will do you harm.
But let us come to Alexander, who was a man
of such great goodness, that among the other
praises which are accorded him is this, that
in the fourteen years he held the empire
no one was ever put to death by him unjudged;
nevertheless, being considered effeminate
and a man who allowed himself to be governed
by his mother, he became despised, the army
conspired against him, and murdered him.
第１９章 軽蔑され憎悪されるのを避けること
さて，上で言及した性質については，重要なことは述べてきましたが，それ以外のことについて，つぎのような概要のもとに手短かに論じてみようと思います。つまり，一部前にも言いましたが，君主は，憎まれたり軽蔑されたりするようなことを，どうやって避けたらよいかを考えておかなければならないということです。これをうまく避けるたびに，その役割を果すことになり，他の非難を浴びてもなんら危険を恐れる必要はないのです。
なににもまして，君主が憎悪されるのは，すでに述べたように，強欲となり臣民の財産や婦女子を侵害することであり，君主はこの二つを差し控えなければなりません。そして臣民の財産や名誉に手を出さなければ，大多数の人は満足して生活し，それで，君主は少数の者の野心とだけ闘えばよく，その野心は簡単に多くの方法で抑えこむことができるのです。
君主が移り気で，軽薄で，軟弱で，心は狭く，優柔不断だと思われると，軽蔑されます。それで君主は，暗礁から身を守るように，これらから身を守らなければなりません。そして，自分の行為に偉大さや勇気や真剣さや剛毅さが示されるよう努力すべきです。また臣民を私的に扱うさいにも，その判断が撤回不能であることを示し，だれも彼を欺いたり言いくるめたり望むべくもないという評判を守らなければなりません。
自分のこうした印象を作った君主は高く評価され，高く評価される君主は容易に陰謀を企てられることはありません。というのは，彼が優れた人物で，その民衆から崇敬されていることが知れわたっていれば，攻撃するのは困難なのですから。こういうわけで，君主は二つのことを懸念しておかなければなりません。一つは，その臣民に関る国の内部からの懸念であり，もう一つは，外国勢力に関る国外からの懸念なのです。国外からの懸念は，しっかりと武装し良好な同盟関係を結べば防げるもので，またしっかり武装していれば，良い友好国は見つかるものです。情勢が陰謀でかき乱されているというのでなければ，国外関係が平穏なら，国内はいつも平穏でしょうし，国外情勢が騒然としてる場合でさえ，君主が準備万端整えて，私が述べてきたとおりに生活していれば，自暴自棄とならないかぎり，君主はあらゆる攻撃に耐えていけるでしょう。それはスパルタのナビスの事績について述べたとおりです。
しかし，その臣下については，国外情勢が騒然としているときは，彼らが秘かに陰謀を企てることだけを懸念すべきですが，そのことからは，君主は憎悪され軽蔑されるのを避け，民衆が彼に満足しているようにしておけば，容易に身を守ることができます。これまで長々と述べてきたように，このことを達成することが，君主にはもっとも必要なことなのです。君主が陰謀に対抗するもっとも効果的な対策の一つは，民衆から憎悪され軽蔑されないことなのです。というのは，君主にたいして陰謀を企てる者は，いつでも君主を除くことで民衆が喜ぶと期待するものなのです。しかし陰謀家が民衆を怒らせるだけだとわかれば，彼が直面する困難には際限がないので，そうした計画を実行する勇気は挫けます。経験が示すとおり，これまで陰謀は多数なされましたが，成功したのはわずかです。なぜなら，陰謀家は単独では行動できず，また仲間にひき入れることができるのは，不満を抱いていると思える連中しかなく，不平分子に本心を明かすや，そいつが満足する素材を与えるしかなくなるのですから。というのも，陰謀家を告発することでも彼は利益を得られ，それだから，この計画から得られる利得が確かなもので，それ以外は不確かで危険に満ちているという点では，陰謀家に誠実であるためには，仲間にするのは無二の親友か，君主の筋金入りの敵しかないのです。
そして，問題を小さな範囲に限定すれば，陰謀家の側には，恐怖や嫉妬や彼をおののかせる刑罰という予想しかないのに，君主の側には，君主権の威光や法律，彼を守る友人や国家の保護があるのだ，と言えましょう。だから，これらすべてに加えて民衆の好意があれば，向う見ずにも陰謀を企てるのはだれにも不可能でしょう。一般に陰謀家はその策略の実行の前にはたじろぐものですが，この場合には犯罪の結末にも恐れを抱かざるをえないのです。なぜなら，それに関して，民衆を敵にまわし，そうして逃れる望みを持てないからです。
この問題については数多くの事例を挙げることができますが，私たちの父の代の記憶に残る一例で満足してきましょう。ボローニャの君主，アンニバーレ・ベンティヴォリオ公(現アンニバーレ公の祖父)は，公への陰謀を企てたカンネスキ家に殺害され，その一族では幼少のジョヴァンニ公[42]だけが生き延びたのでした。その暗殺の直後，民衆は蜂起して，カンネスキ家の者を皆殺しにしたのです。これはその時代，ボローニャでベンティヴォリオ家が受けた民衆の好意から発っしたものでした。この好意はとても大きく，アンニバーレ死後には国家を統治できる者がだれも残っていなかったけれど，ボローニャ人たちは，その頃には鍛冶屋の倅だと思われていたが，ベンティヴォリオ一族の者がフィレンツェにいると聞きつけ，彼をさがしにフィレンツェに使いを出し，その市の統治を彼に委ね，ジョヴァンニ公がやがて統治できるようになるまで，彼が市を支配したのです。
こういうわけで，民衆が君主を尊重しているときは，君主は陰謀を気にすることはないと，思います。しかし，民衆が敵対しており，君主に憎悪を抱いているのなら，君主はすべてのこと，すべての者に懸念を抱くべきです。きちんと秩序立った国家と賢明な君主は，なにごとにつけ，貴族がすてばちにならぬよう，民衆が安心立命できるよう図ってきました。というのも，これは君主のもっとも重要な目標の一つだからです。
当代のもっともよく秩序だち統治された王国のうちに，フランスがありますが，そこには王の自由と安全が依ってたつ多くのすばらしい制度が見いだされます。その中で第一のものは高等法院とその権威です。なぜなら，王国の創設者は貴族の野心やその大胆さを知っており，彼らを抑えこむには，その口に轡をくわえさせることが必要だと思っていました。その一方で，民衆が，恐怖に基づいて，貴族に憎悪を抱いていることも知っていたので，民衆を保護したいと思ったのですが，しかし，このために，王が特別に関心を払いたくはなかったのです。それで，貴族から民衆寄りだと非難され，民衆から貴族の味方だと非難されるのを避けるため，王にたいする非難を起こさずに，強者を挫き弱者に味方する裁定者を設置したのです。これ以上に優れており，しかも細心の注意を払った布置はないでしょうし，王と王国の安全をこれ以上に確保するものもないでしょう。このことから，もう一つ重要な結論を引き出すことができます。それはつまり，君主は非難を受けるような事柄は他人に手に委せて，自分の手には温情のあるものだけを残しておけばよいということです。さらに言えば，君主は貴族を尊重しながらも，そのことで民衆から憎しみを買わないようにすべきだと思うのです。
おそらく，ローマ皇帝の生き死にを検証して，その多くが私の意見の反証となっており，そのうちの何人かは高貴に生き，精神の偉大な資質を示しながらも，帝国を失なったり，陰謀を企てた臣民に殺害されたりしていると言う人たちが現われることでしょう。そこで，この反論に答えるために，ローマ皇帝の幾人かの性格を思い起こし，その破滅の原因が私の主張するとこと異らないことを示しておきましょう。同時に考察にあたり，当時の事情を研究する人には注目に価する事柄について，意見を述べることにします。
哲人皇帝マルクスからマクシミヌスまで帝国を継承した皇帝たちを全員取り上げれば十分でしょう。それは，マルクスとその子コモドゥス，ペルティナクス，ユリアヌス，セウェルス，その子アントニヌス・カラカラ，マクリヌス，ヘリオガバルス，アレクサンデル，マクシミヌスの諸帝です。
まず注意してほしいのは，他の君主国では貴族の野心と民衆の不遜と取り組めばよいだけですが，ローマ皇帝は兵士たちの残酷と強欲に耐えるという第三の困難を抱えこんでいたことです。これは多くの皇帝が身を滅ぼすという，とても厄介な問題でした。というのは兵士と民衆の両方を満足させるのは難しい事だからです。なぜなら，民衆は平和を愛するもので，それだから，彼らは現状満足型の君主を愛するのですが，一方，兵士のほうは，大胆で残忍で強欲な好戦的な君主を愛するのです。それにこうした特質を皇帝が民衆にたいして行使することを兵士たちはとても喜んだのですが，そうやって兵士たちは二重に支払いを受け，強欲と残忍さのはけ口を得たのです。こうして，生れながらか修練によって，大きな権限をもたない皇帝は，いつも打倒され，皇帝の多く，特に新に君主の座に就いた者は，この相反する二つの気性のもつ困難を認めながらも，兵士を満足させる傾向にあり，民衆が傷つけられることにはあまり気を懸けなかったのです。こうした成行きはしかたのないことでした。なぜなら，君主がだれからも憎まれないことはできないことで，まず第一に，君主はだれからも憎まれないように努力すべきですが，それが達成できなければ，もっとも力あるものから憎まれないよう，最大限の努力を払うべきなのです。ですから，こうした皇帝は，経験のなさから，民衆よりも兵士のほうにしっかり結びついた特別の愛顧をかける必要があったのです。こと成行きが君主の利につながるかどうかは，君主が兵士たちに権威を維持する方法を知っているかどうかによりました。
こうした理由から，マルクス・アウレリウス，ペルティナクス，アレクサンデルはみな質素な生活をし，正義を愛し，残忍を憎み，人情厚く，温和でありましたが，マルクスを除けば，悲惨な最期をとげました。マルクスだけは名誉のうちに生きそして死にました。なぜなら，彼は玉座を世襲の称号として引き継いだのであり，兵士にも民衆にもなんら負うところがなかったからです。そして後には，尊敬を受ける多くの徳を身につけて，生きているうちは両者をしかるべき秩序を保ち，憎悪されることも軽蔑されることもありませんでした。
しかしペルティナクスは，兵士の意にさからって帝位についた皇帝であり，兵士たちはコモドゥスの下で放埒に生きるのに慣れていたので，ペルティナクスが彼らに無理強いた質素な生活には耐えられなかったのです。こうして憎悪の原因をもたらしたのですが，その上に彼が老齢であったため軽蔑までが加わり，その統治のごく初期のうちに打倒されたのでした。そして，ここで注意しておきたいのは，憎悪されるようになるのは，悪い行いによってではなく，良い行いによるほうが多いということです。ですから，以前に言ったように，君主はその国家を保とうとすれば，しばしば悪行をせざるをえないのです。というのは，君主が自身を維持するために必要だと考える集団が，それが民衆であれ兵士であれ貴族であれ，堕落しているなら，その気風に合わせ，彼らを喜ばせざるをえず，それで，良い行いが君主を害することにもなるのです。
さてアレクサンデルに話を移すと，この人は非常に善良で，彼に与えられた賞賛の中でも特に，十四年にわたって判決なしに皇帝により死を賜わった者がいなかったことで称えられています。それにもかかわらず，彼はめめしくて，母親に統治を左右されるような人物とみなされて，軽蔑され，軍隊に背かれて殺害されました。